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Book Review
Embryology, Epigenesis, and Evolution. Jason Scott Robert. Cambridge University Press, 2004. 158
pages. Hardcover $60. ISBN 0-521-82467-2.
Philosophy of Experimental Biology. Marcel Weber. Cambridge University Press, 2005. 358 pages.
Hardcover $75. ISBN 0-521-82945-3.
The latest volumes in the Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology series, these two books
represent the new generation of philosophers of biology. This new generation has shifted the foci of
philosophical concerns from the “traditional” topics of e.g., units of selection, the nature of species,
adaptationism, to sustainability, biological complexity, developmental biology, and biodiviersity, among
others. This shift is perhaps better characterized less as a shift and more as an expansion of philosophical
interest beyond just (or primarily) those of evolutionary biology and genetics. By no means an
abandonment of concerns regarding evolutionary biology (or an indication that the “traditional” topics
have been happily resolved), this shift in focus speaks to the fuller awareness and appreciation of
biological matters other than evolutionary theory and their philosophical significance.
Jason Scott Robert’s Embryology, Epigenesis, and Evolution is subtitled “Taking Development
Seriously.” Rejecting what he sees as the mistaken view of many philosophers of biology (and of too
many biologists) that biological development is simply, or even primarily, a matter of gene activation and
regulation, Robert claims that the processes and mechanisms of differentiation, morphogenesis, and
growth both reveal and illuminate important philosophical issues. The first chapter (“The Problem of
Development”) details the central problem of development: how it is that a relatively simple,
homogeneous cellular mass can become a relatively complex, heterogeneous organism. Robert
acknowledges a deep connection between this central problem and modern molecular genetics, but denies
that the latter provides a thorough explanation of the former. As he puts it, “The trick is to integrate
[genetic] explanations with other developmental (cellular, environmental, and ecological) explanations
within a larger organismal framework, rather than to assume that we understand development because we
are beginning to grasp gene function” (p. 22). Chapter Two (“Exemplars”) provides three case studies
that he uses to focus discussion throughout the remainder of the book. This is followed in the next two
chapters (“Scylla and Charybdis” and “Constitutive Epigenetics”) by a tracing out of two historical
strands in the history of biology, as well as the metaphors that have grown out of those strands and
influence current thinking regarding development. The two strands are preformationism (something
preformed develops into a mature organism) and epigenesis (guided/caused by some directing principle, a
mature organism emerges from some simpler homogeneity over time; the organism is formed during
ontogenesis rather than pre-existing it). Robert traces these two strands from Hippocrates and Aristotle up
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through the 20th century. More important philosophically, Robert looks at the related metaphors,
especially of late, that have played a role in the debate between these two strands, metaphors such as
“information,” “programme,” and “triggering.” For example, he points out at least two accounts of
information, which are not always distinguished from each other: causal accounts and intentional
accounts. Experimental results indicate that information is the causal sense is found in a wide range of
sources, not only in or with genes. Likewise, information in the intentional sense (of being about
something) has been shown also not to be gene-privileged. Quite simply, he says, “no coherent account
of biological information has yet emerged that would justify the usual position that genes are uniquely
informational” (p. 56). The view of genetic primacy should be replaced, for Robert, by one of
“constitutive epigenetics”: epigenetic events are developmental interactions within the whole-cell
organism in its developmental context. Many epigenetic structures, he claims, are not stable and do not
pre-exist the interaction, but rather emerge from these interactions in ontogenetic space and time. Chapter
Five (“Creative Development”) fleshes out this notion of constitutive epigenetics.
The final two chapters (“A New Synthesis?” and “The Devil is in the Gestalt”) focus on the relationship
between developmental biology and evolutionary theory, a position now commonly referred to as
evolutionary developmental biology, or evo-devo. Arguing that evo-devo is a true synthesis, not a
subsuming of development to evolution or vice versa, Robert uses several case studies to identify two
fundamental relations between development and evolution: (1) most evolutionary changes are introduced
during ontogeny and (2) developmental mechanisms themselves evolve. This genuine synthesis, rather
than a subsuming, is what Robert considers taking development seriously, rather than development being
something to explain away. “How we understand both heredity and evolution depends crucially on how
we understand development” (p. 109). At least in part, then, development is an explanans, not an
explanandum.
Where Robert’s book is a detailed analysis of one area in biology (development), Weber’s book is an
analysis of various standard topics in the philosophy of science generally with respect to their relation to
biological epistemology (i.e., experimental biology). In the book’s initial footnote, Weber remarks that an
anonymous reader for Cambridge University Press suggested that the work is not a study in the
philosophy of biology, but in the philosophy of science as applied to biology. That’s right. Each of the
book’s nine chapters focus not on standard philosophy of biology topics (again, such as units of selection
or adaptationism) but on standard philosophy of science topics, such as reductionism, hypothesis testing,
reference and conceptual change, and realism. The emphasis, of course, is on how these relate to biology,
particularly biological practice and experiments. As Weber puts it, the book looks at ways in which
scientific knowledge is structured, how it explains natural phenomena, how it is generated and evaluated,
and how it connects to the world. Throughout the work, Weber relies on experimental cases from various
branches of biology (e.g., neurobiology, biochemistry, microbiology).
The initial chapter is a detailed introduction to and summary of the remaining chapters. Chapter Two
(“Reductionism and the Nature of Explanations”) examines reductionistic explanations and argues for
legitimate explanatory reduction of biology to chemistry and physics, at least for parts of biology, such as
neurobiology. Included is the claim that functional explanations, at least ones not framed in etiological
terms, are consistent with the reduction that Weber embraces.
Chapter Three (“Discovery: Solving Biological Problems”) highlights the well-known Krebs cycle
experiments as a departure point for discussing arguments concerning scientific discovery, in particular
the search for a logic of discovery (or generative reasoning). Following an analysis and critique of two
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models of generative reasoning, proposed by Ken Schaffner and Lindley Darden, Weber concludes that a
common dynamic pattern of discovery can be identified, nevertheless, the most efficient problem-solving
heuristics are domain specific, and, hence, not promising for a grander version of a logic of discovery.
The next chapter (“Scientific Inference: Testing Hypotheses”) continues the emphasis on scientific
processes, though here focusing on traditional questions of underdetermination and Bayesian analysis of
confirmation and evidence. Drawing especially on the work of Deborah Mayo, Weber demonstrates from
detailed work in biochemistry that control of errors is the primary concern in theory (and hypothesis)
testing, but not error in a formal, statistical sense.
Chapter Five (“Experimental Systems: A Life of Their Own?”) captures, in miniature, the main thrust of
the entire book, a move away from theory-dominated philosophy of science to an approach that stresses
the study of experimental practice and laboratory settings. If science really is, as many scientists
themselves claim, more about appropriate methods and techniques of producing and evaluating reliable
data then about the actual results of those methods and techniques, then philosophy of science, to be
intellectually responsible, needs to focus on “science as practice” more than “science as theory (or
product).” Chapter Six (“Model Organisms: Of Flies and Elephants”) continues this emphasis on actual
laboratory practice by enunciating historical and contextual reasons why certain biological exemplars
(e.g., Thomas Morgan’s fruit flies) became the currency of experimentation.
Chapter Seven (“Reference and Conceptual Change: Out of Mendel’s Garden?”) is a straightforward look
at the traditional issue of meaning change and reference change across time and theories. Focusing on
how the concept of a gene was understood and used across the century and a half since Mendel, Weber
argues that Philip Kitcher’s notion of reference potential (as opposed to, say, Kripke’s causal account)
best captures the historically “floating reference” of the term “gene.”
Chapter Eight (“Developmental Biology and the Genetic Program: Explaining Ontology”) contains
Weber’s analysis of the material that Robert spends his book on, namely challenges to the geneticist
program by developmental systems theory, along with discussion of the notion of biological information.
Here Weber especially the notion of causality, or causal parity, in his critique of both the geneticists and
the developmental systems theorists. Finally, Chapter Nine (“Scientific Realism: In Search of the Truth”)
addresses the old saw of realism and antirealism. He wrestles with some of the standard issues (e.g., if
realism is false, scientific progress would be a miracle; theory realism vs. entity realism) and comes down
to the conclusion that biologists rest their ontological beliefs in the reliability of the experimental
procedures used.
What do these two books tell us? Several decades ago, Paul Feyerabend complained of the “creeps and
incompetents” writing philosophy of science, by which he meant philosophers who had relatively little
scientific expertise yet made proclamations on the nature and value of science. This complaint clearly
does not apply to either of these authors. As noted above, they are representative of a new emphasis in
philosophy of science on experiment, as opposed to theory or concepts, as the staring point of
philosophical analysis. They also are representative of a new emphasis in philosophy of biology on topics
other than, exclusively, evolution and molecular genetics. Robert’s is the more sustained volume, truly a
monograph, while Weber’s is a confederation of essays relating biological experimentalism to topics in
philosophy of science broadly speaking. Both are substantive and detailed. Both are fecund and timely.
They speak well of the excellent reputation enjoyed by the Cambridge series on philosophy and biology.
Their audience really is for philosophers of science and philosophers of biology only, as the treatment of
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even those topics that relate to other areas of philosophy (e.g., reference) is minimally enhanced by these
works. Nonetheless, they are very fruitful works in their fields and should receive a large audience.
David Boersema
Pacific University
